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Summary  
Introduction 
This paper makes three related arguments against the way in which the literature 
on contemporary social movements (1) conceptualises its subject. It argues, firstly, 
that the problematic developed in the literature represents a political reductionism 
within which the ascription of a specific form of instrumental rationality to these 
movements appears both as premise and as conclusion. 
Secondly, it undertakes an immanent critique of the substantive analyses developed 
within the literature; here it argues that the effects of this reductionism are to 
systematically block the literature from effectively theorising the areas that are 
taken as important. In this context, neither the scope (boundaries, spectrum of 
issues, range of activities) of movements, nor their "social bases", appear as 
adequately theorised in relation to the internal demands of the literature. 
Finally, the paper argues that this blockage can be resolved by an approach which 
treats the modes of rationality operative in these contexts as an open question, 
which can only be resolved by an interaction between the local rationalities of social 
researchers and movement activists, rather than by the ascription of one to the 
other. This, however, implies an escape from a problematic which remains, even 
with the most "culturalist" authors, ultimately a form of political reductionism. 
Methodological rationalism and instrumental 
rationality 
The most basic difficulty of the literature is its implicit reliance on a rationalist 
methodology, here contrasted both with empiricist and critical realist approaches 
(McLellan 1981). The effect of this is that the dominant approach treats the 
theorist's own local form of rationality as universal, rather than taking the question 
of the modes of rationality in operation in "new social movements" as an open 
question for research. Here the assumptions of an affirmative modernism confirm 
the mirror-image arguments of postmodernists in treating instrumental rationality 
as identical with rationality tout court, despite the arguments levelled against this 
position by Habermas (1987) and the alternative forms of rationality identified by 
Weber (1984) and Habermas (1984). More generally, a rationalist approach 
amounts to taking the nominal subject of research for granted in its total 
subordination to the theorist's discourse; the methodological difficulties entailed - 
including the question of the relevance of the material selected - are exemplified in 
a discussion of Giddens (1990) and Scott (1990). Much of this represents a 
confusion between methodology and ontology; the rationally constructed ideal type, 
which for Weber was a heuristic device, to which reality should be compared, is 
taken as representing, or even substituting for, that reality (Weber 1984, Sadri 
1992). 
Within the literature, then, a specific kind of (individual, collective, societal) 
rationality is ascribed, unexamined, to the contexts in question; the result of this is a 
political reductionism within which only those meanings and practices which 
correspond to the theorist's perception of what is instrumentally rational are 
admitted (Raschke 1985: 17). This is sometimes, as in RMT, an explicit 
methodological presupposition (see Cohen 1985: 674 - 676 for a critique); 
"European" approaches effectively offer a discourse of rationality at a collective or 
societal level. This problematic then places the focus is on political action in pursuit 
of given interests, and other forms of activity are treated as a priori irrelevant. In 
this problematic (Althusser 1969), sociology is effectively reduced to variants of 
political economy. Furthermore, the exercise is circular: the author's definition of 
rationality appears not only as a methodological premise but also as a substantive 
conclusion. This is exemplified in relation to Alan Scott's (1990) approach. 
Political reductionism as a self-defeating exercise 
The "new social movements" literature is highly vulnerable to immanent critique: its 
political reductionism systematically prevents it from tackling much of its nominal 
subject. A preliminary, and largely unexamined, problem is the (idealist and even 
"empiricist") procedure of defining "movements" by their relation to "issues" 
(Bagguley 1992); this procedure effectively offers a "black box" means of relating 
interests and action. The resulting treatment of a multiplicity of discrete 
"movements" is, however, undermined by the simultaneous assumption that these 
movements share a single social basis. 
Leaving this aside for the moment, there is a disjuncture in the literature between 
those "movements" which are mentioned as relevant, listed in introductions, appear 
in definitions, etc. and those which are systematically examined. While 
introductions commonly mention movements with a sociocultural orientation, the 
movements of the 1960s and relatively small movements, analysis is heavily 
concentrated on the large political movements of the 1970s and 1980s: the women's 
movement, the peace movement and the ecology movement; even within these, the 
women's and peace movements appear to present such difficulties for the dominant 
problematic that the ecology movement dominates the discussion. Where such 
procedures explicitly justified, it is because of its political significance (Brand 1982: 
8-9) or the difficulties in discussing other movements (Giddens 1990: 161-2): in 
other words, the operation is self-confirming. More importantly, the conceptual 
tools available appear incapable of dealing with the range of movements which are 
nominally to be addressed. 
This "narrowing of issue breadth" is paralleled by a "lessening of social depth": the 
range of activities which are initially taken as phenomena to be explained by the 
literature are then in practice reduced to those which fit into the model of a political 
transmission from interests to action. Hence the question of what contemporary 
movements consist of is rarely practically theorised (Diani 1992: 2 - 3). Instead, 
attention focuses on the questions of what their meaning is or how they "work". 
Once again usage is narrower than definitions; and the operation is both self-
confirming and unexamined in any wider terms. It is here that the effects of the new 
social movements "problematic" are most visible: what is not visibly "political" 
remains undertheorised. This is consistent with a definition of "movements" in terms 
of "issues" and with the narrowing of issue breadth. 
Perhaps the most dramatic disjuncture is that of the discussion of the "social basis" 
of contemporary movements. The assumption of instrumental rationality leads to the 
attempt to discover an appropriate relationship between the social interests of this 
basis and the action of contemporary movements on the polity. This takes various 
forms: universal interests, straightforward structural determinisms, and 
constructivist accounts; all of these point away from a phenomenological analysis of 
movements and towards a deduction of the nature of the movements from macro-
theoretical assumptions about the nature of contemporary society in terms of a 
discussion of class structure, of the nature of modernity, and so on. However, this 
means that the relation between "basis" and "movement", posited as a premise and 
appearing as a conclusion, fails to find the kind of confirmation that is implied by 
the argument. 
Instead, the most convincing discussions in this area (Melucci 1989; Clemens 1990; 
Freeman XX; Diani 1992) point away from an exclusive focus on "movements" and 
"issues" to wider socio-cultural contexts which are neither exhausted by an account 
of "interests" nor organised in terms of instrumental rationality; furthermore, these 
contexts appear as both more stable and less "issue-" specific than the "movements" 
that develop out of them. Nevertheless, the literature systematically avoids taking the 
next logical step and treating these contexts as the object of analysis; this distancing 
from goal-rational assumptions is not sustained. Instead, these contexts are taken 
simply as preconditions for movement activity; this can only be explained in terms 
of a definition of relevance for which only (directly or indirectly) political events are 
"real". Within the "social movements" problematic as currently constructed, in other 
words, even the most "culturalist" authors are ultimately contained within an 
assumption of the "last instance" priority of political goal-rationality. 
Towards a more adequate account of ecological 
meanings and practices 
What is lost is the possibility of an approach which would start from (but not be 
exhausted by) an investigation of the "life-world" contexts of movement activity, 
would have the potential to resolve the disjunctures of the "new social movements" 
problematic, in other words to offer a more adequate account of the interaction of 
social being and social consciousness in the formation of movement activity; to 
replace this activity within the total lived experience of those involved in such a way 
as to avoid privileging those elements which are relevant to an ultimately 
teleological account of instrumental rationality; and hence to offer a place for the 
different forms of action of the 1960s - and indeed the 1990s -, the different 
emphases of apparently "cultural" activity, and the smaller-scale modes of 
organisation of other contemporary movements. Even if the ultimate focus of 
interest is on the political impact of social movements, an adequate conception of 
their roots is a prerequisite for any effective discussion of the nature of the 
movements in question. Such an approach would make it possible to exploit the 
distinction drawn by Habermas (1984) and Offe (1985) between instrumental and 
communicative rationality, within the latter of which social movements are 
positioned or which they aim to defend and expand, as well as taking account of the 
arguments by authors such as Melucci (1989) and Sulkunen (1992) of the presence 
in these or related contexts of radicalised forms of reflexivity, which undercut 
instrumental rationality by turning forms of organisation, for example, into an end 
in themselves rather than simply a means to an end. 
In relation to "green" movement activity, this allows a more satisfactory theorisation 
of the relationship between party and movement activity, a more sensitive account 
of the communicative rationalisations and disembedding mechanisms which 
transmit "green" ideologies, images and artefacts beyond the originating life-world 
context, and (most importantly) the reintegration of such varied forms of activity as 
communal living, alternative economic organisation, New Travellers, neo-
paganism, the alternative press, Third World solidarity groups, and so on. At the 
same time, it challenges the isolation of the "green movement" from, for example, 
the alternative economy, the women's movement, the peace movement, and so on. 
This implies, not an atheoretical empiricism, but a mode of critical realism which 
interrogates the ethnographic evidence of face-to-face contexts and the internal 
documentary evidence of disembedding modes of interaction for its relation to less 
accessible areas of social reality. Here the local rationality of the researcher neither 
pretends to absent itself (as in empiricism) nor claims self-sufficiency (as in 
rationalism); a better model is Gramsci's (1971: 5-23) arguments about the 
relationship between "traditional" and "organic" intellectuals - arguments which 
might perhaps better be transposed to the relevant modes of intellectual activity. It 
could then be argued, following Habermas (1984) and McLellan (1981), that local 
modes of rationality are not incommensurable but can be transcended through 
critical evaluation of validity claims, in this case those of the researched and of the 
researcher. 
This is most easy to do in terms of a model of the generation of skills and knowledge 
in these contexts as the practical expression of local modes of rationality, whether 
communicative or instrumental; in a further step, it can be asked how the objects of 
communication (about which understanding is to be reached) or instrumental 
action are conceived within these contexts. On this account, environmental action 
would be interpreted, not in terms of the points at which it reaches a form familiar 
to the researcher, but at the points where it is generated. The questions of 
"reception" within the wider society are then naturally important ones, but they 
cannot be taken to exhaust either the "intentions" of their "authors" or, more 
importantly, the articulation of their authors' own life-activity (2). Such an 
approach can go some way towards bridging the gap between accounts of 
contemporary social movements and the theorisation of "old" social movements 
(Thompson 1968, Wilde 1990) as well as some cultural studies perspectives on 
youth culture (McRobbie 1994). 
This approach may make possible not only an alternative account of the sources of 
ecological action but also an alternative account of the nature of ecological ideology 
(Eagleton 1991); in place of accounts of false consciousness (Eder 1985), self-
interest (see above), simple correspondence (Giddens 1990) and so on it could be 
argued that this ideology finds its deepest roots in the modes of rationality of the 
life-worlds from which contemporary movements develop (3). 
Taking as an example the concept of sustainability, a number of illustrations from 
different contexts suggest that its practical force comes from the attempts to realise 
an "alternative society", based around a withdrawal from "the system", hence 
necessarily aiming at "self-sufficiency", and aiming to realise a different mode of 
(communicative, substantive) rationality within which sustainability represents the 
combination of a number of ethical and cognitive assessments of rational modes of 
behaviour. 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Sociological Association of 
Ireland's annual conference in Clonmel (May 1995). 
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Footnotes 
(1) The paper deals mostly, but not exclusively, with the "European" social theory 
tradition rather than the "American" tradition, dominated by resource mobilisation 
theory. However, it does not make what is in any case an increasingly artificial 
distinction between those authors who make use of the phrase "new social 
movements" and those who prefer a different language: a programmatic 
commitment to the newness of the movements in question is now less common, 
while much of the literature which rejects the concept of "new" movements 
nevertheless retains the same focus of interest. 
(2) This can be put in more "instrumental" terms; in Weber's (1984) account, a 
clear distinction is drawn between intentional action oriented towards the action of 
others (Weber's definition of "social action") and the outcomes of this action in the 
"strategic" environment where others are also behaving in this way. One implication 
of this is that it is not sufficient to treat the appearance of electoral activity, 
consumerist environmentalism, "green" styles, and so on as a simple confirmation of 
the universality of instrumental rationality. In a first stage, these are responses to 
perceived external situations, or the perceived activities of others, and hence less 
"representative" for the life-worlds of ecological activists than of their perception of 
the external world - within which the very emphasis on the perceived instrumental 
logic of the social totality underlines the perceived difference of the life-world. In a 
second stage, however, the social totality can itself more usefully be seen as 
constituted by its active fields of struggle (Touraine 1981); the implications of this 
for any simple instrumentalism are far-reaching. 
(3) Here I am taking it as read that Weber's concept of "elective affinity" (Weber 
1958) is a necessary starting point for any account of how the writings of 
"traditional intellectuals" (Gramsci 1971) become taken up and redeployed in 
alternative discourses, even though a number of authors (Redclift 1987) seem 
content to offer the existence of the Club of Rome report as a sufficient reason for 
the development of an alternative movement. This tendency to ascribe a completely 
independent role to "high" culture has a long history in this area (e.g. Roszak 1969).  
 
